The economic viability of the reusablc core-based design paradigm depends on the development of techniques for intellectual property protection. We introduce the first dynamic watermarking technique for protecting the value of intellectual property of CAD and com pilation tools and reusable core components. The essence of the new approach is the addition of a set of design and timing con straints which encodes the author's signature. The constraints are selected in such a way that they result in minimal hardware over head while embedding the signature which is unique and difficult to detect, remove and forge. We establish the first set of relevant met rics which forms the basis for the quantitative analysis, evaluation, and comparison of watermarking techniques. We develop a generic approach for signature data hiding in designs, which is applicable in conjunction with an arbitrary behavioral synthesis task, such as scheduling, assignment, allocation, and transformations. Error cor recting codes are used to augment thc protection of the signature data from tampering attempts. On a large set of design examples, studies indicate the effectiveness of the new approach in a sense that the signature data, which are highly resilient, difficult to detect and remove, and yet easy to verify, can be embedded in designs with very low hardware overhead.
Introduction

Motivation
Reusable cores recently emerged as one of the most visible and important components on which future design approaches will be based. Exponential growth of both applications and implementa tion technology have outpaced the design productivity of the tra ditional synthesis process. There is a wide consensus that through reuse of optimized cores the demands of applications and ultra large scale integration will be matched. Both industry and academia have expressed a great interest on ways how to conduct core-based de signs. For example, all CAD vendors and majority of design houses and silicon foundries joined the Virtual Socket Initiative [7] .
There is another wide consensus that viability of the new tech nology depends on the development of sound mechanisms for in tellectual property protection (IPP) [6, 7] . Although there are sev eral forms of protection available for intellectual property in the electronic design automation industry which include patents, copy rights, mask works, trademarks and trade secrets [4] , all these meth ods are insufficient and/or inapplicable for intellectual property pro tection of reusable cores. In the last few years numerous water marking or signature hiding techniques have been proposed for im age, video, voice and text data [1] . However, these techniques do 1 This research was supported in part by NSF under grant CCB-9734l66.
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We propose a new approach which is specifically developed for intellectual property protection of designs and CAD tools. The approach embeds distributed encoded messages in deep structural property of designs at all levels of design process with minimal hardware overhead while maintaining the correctness and function ality of designs. CAD tools are protected in the same way by em bedding signatures in designs that they produce. It is based on the key property of design space exploration in behavioral synthesis such that there are numerous competitive solutions. The idea is to select one of the competitive solutions which encodes a signature. Searching for such solution with the embedded signature is diffi cult, if not an impossible task. However, generating such a design that satisfies the original specified constraints as well as additional watermarking constraints is both easy and time efficient.
Motivational Example
To illustrate the key ideas behind the new approach, we consider the design shown in Figure 1 . The design is a 4th order continued fraction infinite impulse response (CF llR) filter [3] . Figure lea) shows the control data fl ow graph (CDFG) for the filter. Values that are generated in one control step and used in a later step must be stored in a register during the intermediate control steps. A variable is live between the time it is generated (written) and the last use (read) of it. This interval is called the lifetime of the variable. Two variables whose lifetimes do not overlap can be stored in the same register. The interval graph [12] is constructed such that for each variable, a node is made in the graph and two nodes are connected if the lifetimes of the corresponding variables overlap. Register assignment can be performed by coloring the in terval graph, which is an NP-complete task [5] .
The interval graph for our example is shown in Figure I In addition to the optimality in terms of the number of registers, the control and datapath is embedded with a watermark, "AT', which is extremely difficult to detect without knowing the encoding rules. We showed this watermarked design to many designers in industry and researchers in academia and no one was able to detect the embedded watermark.
The essence of the new approach is the addition of a set of extra constraints which encodes the author's signature. For the register assignment problem, the extra constraints are imposed such that a set of variables are forced to be stored in different registers which result in extra edges in the interval graph. The interval graph along with the extra edges is shown in Figure 2(a) .
We assume the ASCII encoding for the characters to be used in watermarking. 7 bits are used to encode a character in the ASCII code. All the nodes in the interval graph are sorted and numbered in the increasing order of the length of their lifetimes. In the increas ing order of node numbers, each node is considered for embedding a single bit. Each consecutive 7 added edges represent a character in the ASCII code. After all the nodes are considered. we repeat the process from the fi rst node in the order. For each bit i � the wa termark. the terminal node is chosen such that the termmal node number represents the bit value. To embed 1. the terminal node of the added edge should have odd number. To embed O. the terminal node of the added edge should have even number. The fi rst fea sible node in the increasing order of node numbers. starting from the position right after the terminal node of the last edge . added, is selected as the terminal node to embed the bit value. ThIS scheme is to add extra edges more evenly in the graph. The added edges with their encoded values for our example are shown in Figure 2 (b). They encode "10000010 110111" in binary which is equal to "A 7" in the ASCII code.
The probability that any register assignment method will re sult in the same solution with the watermark is extremely low for graphs with reasonably many nodes. For example, the interval graph in Figure ICc) has 35 unique coloring solutions with 5 colors. Therefore, there is 2.9% chance that any good register assignment method finds the same solution, if we assume uniform probabil ity for all possible 5-color solutions. Considering that the interval graph consists of only 19 nodes, the number is low. Even for this small example. we were able to embed a fairly large signature. In Section 5, we show that there are exponentially many competitive solutions for the graphs with a relatively low number of nodes. We emphasize here that the proposed approach targets and is progres sively more effective for large designs. 
Research Objectives
We introduce the dynamic watermarking technique for protecting intellectual property of CAD tools and reusable core components, especially targetting behavioral synthesis. The essence of the new approach is the addition of a set of design and timing constraints as a preprocessing design step which encode the signature of the author. The technique is dynamic in the sense that the watermark ing constraints are chosen as a preprocessing step before the design is performed and thus influence the fi nal design. The constraints are selected in such a way that they result in the minimal overhead in area, throughput, testability, and/or power consumption, while embedding the signature which is unique and difficult to detect and remove. The idea is based on the key property of design space exploration in behavioral synthesis which consists of several inter dependent NP-complete subtasks, where there are many competi tive solutions with similar qUality.
The proposed technique has a spectrum of important unique propcrties. The approach provides the quantitative treatment of the intellectual property protection. The technique is transparent to manual and automatic design processes and therefore can be used in conjunction with any available or future set of design tools. The generic technique is applicable to all design steps. It also provides the designers the ability to embed their signatures easily in many different ways. Another novelty is the connection of watermarking to error correcting codes.
We believe that simplicity, strength, low hardware overhead, distributive nature, resilience against tampering and complete trans parency will make the proposed technique the method of choice . for industrial strength protection of designs, CAD tools, and algonth mic intellectual property. The method also builds conceptual and algorithmic foundation for future research on design intellectual property protection.
Paper Organization
The rest of the paper is organized in the following way. In the next section we outline the related work. In Section 3, the fi rst set of relevant metrics for the quantitative analysis of watermarking techniques is established. In Section 4, a generic approach for data hiding in design is described. We demonstrate the effectiveness of the approach by applying it to register assignment in Section 5. In Section 6, the approach is also applied to several other behavioral synthesis tasks, such as scheduling and transformations. Finally, we conclude by summarizing the key contributions. 
Related Work
In this Section, we review the most relevant related work on water marking for CAD and multimedia.
Data watermarking (also known as data hiding) embeds data into digital media for the purpose of identification, annotation, and copyright. Recently, the proliferation of digitized media and the internet revolution are creating a pressing need for copyright en forcement schemes to protect copyright ownership. Several tech niques for data hiding in digital images, audios, videos and texts have been developed [1) . Craver et a1. discussed a possible attack to any watermarking schemes for multimedia images and proposed a method which is resilient to such attack [2] . The key difference of our proposed approach with those techniques is that all of them embed the watermark in the final object while our approach is in corporated in the design process. In the CAD domain, there have been several proposals for IPP using watermarking at the level of physical layout [9] and logic synthesis [10] .
Objectives and Metrics for Watermarking
In this Section we lay out the technical foundations required to de velop a consistent quantitative approach for intellectual property protection using watermarking techniques. We first analyze the key watermarking properties which imply the quality of the associated data hiding technique. We conclude the Section by summarizing the selected numerical metrics which quantify the effectiveness of a proposed steganography technique for design properties.
Objectives
While the watermarking techniques are to a certain extent related to subjective criteria about their qualities, we focus our attention on the most relevant objective criteria. In order to be effective, the watermark should exhibit the following properties. Note that these objectives can be mutually conflicting.
• Correctness of Functionality. The correctness of function ality should not be affected by the watermark.
• Low Hardware Overhead. The watermark should result in low design performance overhead.
• Transparency. The addition of the watermark to designs by CAD tools should be completely transparent so that it can be used for any existing CAD tools and designs. The design process is already so involved and conceptually and compu tationally difficult that the integration of watermarking con straints would result in numerous algorithmic and software difficulties. This implies that watermarking should be done either as preprocessing or postprocessing step.
• Proof of Authorship. The watermark should be readily de tectable by the owner and law enforcement authorities and unambiguously identify the owner and be accompanied with the convincing proof on its quality.
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• Difficult to Detect. The watermark should be unobtrusive (perceptually invisible). If thieves could find it, they would solve the most difficult piece of the watermark removal prob lem. Note that being difficult to detect implies that special knowledge is required to detect the watermark.
• Resilience. The watermark must be difficult to remove with out significantly degrading the quality of the original design by any techniques which do not have complete knowledge of the design.
• Proportional Part Protection. The watermark should be distributed all over the design in order to facilitate the pro tection of not only the complete design, but also its parts.
Metrics
From the objectives for the watermark, the following metrics which allow the comparison and evaluation of different watermarking tech niques can be identified.
• Strength of the Authorship Proof. The probability of co incidence, Pc, that the same design with the watermark is produced by any other authors must be minimized. The prob ability is proportional to the probability that any specific de sign is produced by a synthesis tool or by a manual design.
• Resilience. We numerically define the resilience by the fol lowing parameters: (i) the probability that k bits of the wa termark is removed by random tampering, e.g., changing a register assignment of one variable in register binding (ii) the number of bits in the watermark, and (iii) the percentage on the number of bits which can be removed while preserving the initially encoded authorship message.
• Design Metrics Degradation. The degradation of the de sign metrics by the watermark must be minimized. The de sign metrics degradation is quantitatively expressed by a per centage alteration of the relevant design metrics due to the embedding of the watermark.
Global Flow for IPP using Watermarking
The generic approach for watermarking designs is shown in Figure   3 . The essence of the new approach is the addition of a set of de sign and timing constraints which encodes the author's signature.
The constraints are selected in such a way that they result in the minimal hardware overhead impact while embedding the signature difficult to detect and remove. The selection of the constraints de pends on the employed encoding scheme. The selection of the en coding scheme to achieve the goal is a key problem. In the process, the proposed metrics for the quantitative analysis of watermarking techniques are used as guidances.
The technique can be also used for fingerprinting. Distributors of intellectual property such as hardware designs, softwares, docu ments, and images wish to prevent registered users from releasing unauthorized copies. Fingerprinting allows a distributor to detect any unauthorized copy and trace it back to the user by uniquely watermarking each copy of intellectual properties.
Watermarking for Register Assignment
As shown in the motivational example in Section 1, the watermark for register assignment solutions can be embedded in designs in the following steps.
First, the signature data to be embedded should be selected. The signature data should be selected such that they uniquely identify the author as the owner of the design.
The selected signature data need to be encoded so that they can be embedded in the design. Different encoding schemes will re sult in different quality watermarking solutions. However, by using a cryptographic technique, the encoded message by any encoding schemes can be transformed to a pseudo-random bitstream by an Table 1 : Experimental results of watermarking the random graph examples in graph coloring: PE -edge probability.
encipher. This step results in two advantages. First, it strengthens the proof of authorship by allowing only the designer with the se cret key to decipher the signature data. Next, it makes the signature data to look like a random bitstream so that the detection of the signature data by unauthorized users using any statistical analysis becomes harder. The message is enciphered in the following steps. First, the author's plaintext signature data is applied to MDS cryptographic hash function. The generated hash is encrypted by the public key of the designer using RSA public key cryptosystem. Using the ob tained cipher as an input, RC4 stream cipher generates a pseudo random keystream. This keystream is combined with the plaintext signature data by a bitwise exclusive-or operation to produce the ciphertext signature data. Finally, the ciphertext signature data are embedded as extra constraints in the design.
We assume same encoding scheme as described in the motiva tional example in Section 1. To improve the reliability of the pro posed intellectual property protection techniques against tampering of design, an error correcting and detection code for the embedded signature are employed. The m-bit error correcting BCH codes [II] have been used to encode the signature data.
Among the metrics, the probabilities of coincidence and tam pering for the watermark are especially primary indicators of its protection strength. We note that the use of the terminology "prob ability" does not follow its exact meaning from mathematics in a rigorous sense. The "probability" in this subsection is rather used as an approximation to the actual probability. We provide the for mula to compute the probabilities for random graphs in graph col oring. For other synthesis tasks, the probabilities can be defined and computed similarly. For a random graph G(n, p) with n nodes and edge probability p, suppose c colors are used and k edges are added as watermarking constraints. Let Pc denote the probability of generating the same coloring solution with the signature, given the solution uses the same number of colors. Pc = (1 -�)k. The probability that any register assignment method will result in t . he same solution with the watermark is extremely low for graphs WIth reasonably many nodes. Let PT denote the probability of removing one or more signature bits by changing colors of one node. We ap proximate thePTby PT = 1-(1-n(n I j(l p) )�-l.lt is based on the following reasoning. On average there are n/c nodes with the same color. The probability that no signature bit is removed can be approximated by the probability that there are no encoded edges between the n/c nodes with the same color.
From these formula, we note that Po decreases exponentially as the number of bits in the signature increases. Thus, it is bet-ter to use a larger signature to prove the authorship. We also note, however, that PT increases as the number of bits in the signature increases, which means that it is better to use a smaller signature for preventing tampering. These two requirements are mutually contradictory. This problem can be resolved by using error correct ing codes (BCC). We can achieve low Po and PT by embedding a large signature with m-bit error correcting codes, where m should increase as the number of bits in the signature inereases. The prob ability of tampering after m-bit error correcting codes are used, is approximated by I:tm+l Pi, where Pi is the probability that i encoded edges are removed by changing colors of one node. Pi is approximated by �.
Experimental Results
To compare and evaluate the effectiveness and efficiency of the heuristic algorithms, standard test cases from the random graph model as well as real-life designs are used. In the random graph model, for a graph G( n, p) with n nodes, edges are generated inde pendently with probability p between each pair of nodes. Although unlikely to have much relevance to practical applications of graph coloring, such a test bed has the advantage in a sense that behavior of any heuristic on one graph of this type is a good predictor for its behavior on any other [8] . The overhead for achieving Po 10-5 0 for the graphs in Table I # of parity bits #of extra forECC colors used 
10-50 and PT
For another research project, we developed a heuristic for the graph coloring problem which outperforms the best heuristics re ported in [8] . The quality of the graph coloring algorithm is pro vided by several key search guidance techniques. A well known technique of subdividing the problem into an iterative search for an optimal maximally independent set is used to partition the prob lem. This idea is augmented with a set of global probabilistic least-constraining most-constrained heuristics which boost the al gorithm's performance. Extensive experimentation has shown that the algorithm outperforms the state-of-the-art techniques reported in [8] in solution quality with an order of magnitude run-time im provement. The algorithm achieves very high probability of eolor ing a random, G(1OOO, 0.5) graph with 85 colors in only S hours on a Sun Sparc5 workstation (1994 model), compared to average 85.S colors for average 136 hours on an IBM 3081 which is much faster than the SpareS workstation. Table I provides the experimental results for various random graphs. The first column presents the number of nodes in the graph and the second column the edge probability. The third eolumn pro vides the number of colors used for the original random graph. The fourth to eighth columns presents the number of edges that can be added before k more colors are added. where k = 0,1,2,3,4.
respectively. When adding edges, 5 edges were added at a time, which explains the fact that all the numbers in Table 1 are mu1-tiples of 5. Since the purpose of this experimentation is not to achieve the minimum possible solution but to generate good quality solutions fast in many times for the demonstration of the effective ness of our approach, we restrict the running time of the heuris tic within a reasonable amount of time. For example, the running time for the graph G(1000, 0.5) is limited to 10 minutes on SUN Sparc5 workstation. In Table 2 we show the overhead for achieving Pc = 10-50 and PT = 10-50, in terms of the number of parity bits used for error correcting codes and the numbcr of extra colors.
Note that even higher level of protection is attainable with more overhead.
# of Edges Added for k More Registers
Design
Nv NR Table 3 : Experimental results of watermarking 15 real-life designs in register assignment: Nv -# of variables, N R -# of registers.
We also applied our approach on 15 real-life designs. The de signs are numbered in the following order: two GE controllers, two Honda controllers, a wavelet fi lter, an NEC digital-to-analog con verter (DAC), two components of moderns, a linear controller for automotive motion control, an LMS audio formatter, a CORDIC, a speech compressor, 2D Wang DCT, 2D Arai DCT, and 2D Lee DCT. We have chosen the small and moderately sized designs to demonstrate the effectiveness of the approach for most difficult ex amples. As the design is smaller, it is harder to embed large sig natures. Table 3 provides the experimental rcsults for the designs.
The second column presents the number of variables in designs and the third column the number of registers used for the origi nal design. The fourth to eighth columns presents the number of edges that can be added before k more registers are used, where k = 0,1,2,3,4, respectively. Tn Table 4 we show the overhead for achieving Pc = 10-50 and PT = 10-50, in terms of the num ber of parity bits used for error correcting codes and the number of extra colors. We assume that the edge probability in all designs is 0.3. It is a moderate assumption since most of the designs result in sparse interval graphs.
All the experimental results show that large watermarks can be embedded in designs while incurring minimal hardware overhead.
6 IPP for Other Behavioral Synthesis Tasks
Transformations
Variables in the original design often disappear after the application of transformations. We embed the author's signature by providing such constraints that particular variables should remain after the application of transformations. For example, we consider associa tivity transformation. The following encoding scheme can be used: All the operations in a design are randomly numbered. A variable Table 3 .
10-50 and PT 
Scheduling
The author's signature is embedded by adding a set of constraints such that two operations with no dependencies are forced to be scheduled in one specifi c order, i.e., an additional edge is added in the transitive closure of the CDFG. A transitive closure of a graph E) is a graph G' = (V, E'), where for every two nodes u and v in V, (u, v) E E' if 3 a path from the node u to the node v. Whenever an edge is added, the transitive closure of the CDFG must be updated accordingly. In addition, the periods between as soon as possible control step and as late as possible control step that an operation can be scheduled to satisfy the timing constraints must be overlapped in at least 2 control steps for the two operations. Otherwise, adding an edge between the operations is not a new con straint. Whenever an edge is added, the periods for operations must be updated accordingly.
The following encoding scheme can be used: All the operations in a design are sorted and numbered based on the degrees of their 
Invalidating False Claims of Ownership
Consider the following scenario. Alice has a design D which is wa termarked by the proposed watermarking scheme. Bob purchases the design D from Alice. There are three cases to consider.
• Finding Unintendecll Signatures: Bob tries to fi nd his sig nature from the design D. Bob claims that D is his design because D has both his and Alice's signatures. In this case, one with more meaningful, longer and stronger signature will be a winner. [t is believed to be a very difficult task to fi nd any meaningful signature from the design. It is much easier to embed the signature in a preprocessing step. Therefore, Alice can protect her authorship by embedding strong water mark.
• Embedding Unauthorized Signatures: Bob embeds his sig nature to the design D and claims that D is his design. In this case, Alice can easily prove that the design belongs to her.
Alice's design has only her signature, but Bob's design has both his and Alice's signatures. Therefore, Alice can prove that it is her design. Note that this type of attack is similar to one described in [2] .
• Thmpering Original Signatures: In this case, Bob tries to tamper Alice's signature by applying local change. There are at least three reasons that discourage this kind of attack. First, these local changes can result in worse design with more hardware overhead. Secondly, error correcting and detec tion codes allow the design to withstand significant amount of attack. Thirdly, once Bob modifies the design, he has to perform all synthesis tasks below the affected part. For ex ample, if the register-transfer level design is modifi ed, then the logic synthesis and physical design should be performed 854 which can make the final design completely different from the original.
Conclusion
We introduced the first dynamic watermarking technique for pro tecting intellectual property of CAD tools and reusable core com ponents. The essence of the new approach is the addition of a set of design and timing constraints which encodes the author's signa ture. The constraints are selected in such a way that they result in the minimal hardware overhead impact while embedding the sig nature difficult to detect and remove.
We established the first set of relevant metrics for the quantita tive analysis of watermarking techniques, which forms the basis for the quantitative analysis, evaluation, and comparison of watermark ing techniques. We developed a generic approach for steganogra phy and use it as a basis for the derivation of a spectrum of tech niques for signature data hiding in designs. Techniques have been applied to several behavioral synthesis tasks, such as scheduling, register assignment, and transformations.
On a large set of design examples, studies indicated the effec tiveness of the new approach in a sense that highly resilient, diffi cult to detect and remove, yet easy to verify signatures are embed ded in the designs with very low hardware overhead.
